A. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

I. EXCLUSIVELY DEPARTMENTAL

It is considered that all operational or combat intelligence and its dissemination is so exclusively departmental as not to be susceptible of joint effort. This requires methods for rapid handling and dissemination which includes the quickest transmission possible.

B. ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES (ADMINISTRATIVE, TRAINING, TRANSLATIONS, ETC.)

I. EXCLUSIVELY DEPARTMENTAL

1. Personnel

The administration of Naval Personnel must, according to law, be performed by the Navy and therefore this adjunct of ONI is considered to be exclusively departmental.

2. Supplies and Accounts, etc.

The activities in this field are in accordance with the directives of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts as well as CNI and are considered to be exclusively departmental.

3. Mail, Files, etc.

Even if the Army, Navy and State adopted the same filing system, there would still be much mail of interest only to ONI and it is therefore not considered practicable to eliminate the ONI Mail Room and files.

4. Naval Records and Library

This activity is a purely Naval library and includes historical Naval records. It is not an intelligence library. This activity is considered exclusively departmental, because convenient access to Naval personnel is necessary.

5. Top Secret control and Dissemination of High Level Material.

This activity controls the dissemination of top secret and high level material within the Navy Department and therefore is considered to be exclusively departmental.

II. MERGER UNDER JOINT DIRECTION

1. Psychological War fare

NIS Susceptible of Separate location Satisfactory.

State, War and Navy are all interested in psychological warfare and it is considered that it lends itself to joint effort.

2. Economic Warfare

MIS Susceptible of Separate location ONI CIG effort. Satisfactory.

State, War and Navy are all interested in economic warfare and it is considered that this activity is susceptible of joint effort.

3. Special Publications

MIS Not susceptible of Should have central location but could operate in separate location.

This activity produces Naval Intelligence Publications. While it may be that an exclusively Naval Intelligence publication, as well as an exclusively Army Intelligence publication, may be desirable; still, this activity lends itself to joint effort for purposes of coordination and the pooling of talents of writers and clerical help and the production of possible joint publications.

4. Reproduction

MIS Not susceptible Should have central A-2 of CIG effort. location.

It is considered that reproduction can be more economically accomplished by joint effort.

5. Training

MIS Not susceptible Should have central A-2 of CIG effort. location, but could operate in separate location.

Some benefit in better training and some economy can be secured by operating training as a joint venture.

6. Translating

MIS Not susceptible Should have central location, but could operate in separate location.

Common pool of translators would seem to be more economical as it would avoid overhead and insure more beneficial employment of the entire group.

7. Photographic Intelligence Center (PIC)

MIS Not susceptible of Separate location Approved For Release 2001/08/27:CIA-RDP64-00658A000100080017-2

(a) Photographic Interpretation Training. (b) Photogrammetry and Cartography Training.

(c) Terrain model production.

(d) Terrain Model Making Training.

(e) Photo Intelligence Operations in Washington for JOS

(f) Photo Intelligence Operations in the field.

(g) Photographic Intelligence Research

While the methods of training and employing photographic intelligence teams now differ in the Army and Navy, still it is believed that it is adaptable to standardisation and joint effort.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

ALLOCATION (NO PARTICIPATION)

1. Army Section of BID

Should have central Not susceptible of MIS location. GIG effort.

The field of intelligence covered by the Wilitary Section of the BID (0100-1200) plus Army Communications and the details of all installations (government owned or leased), such as Posts, Stations, Arsenals, Proving Grounds, etc., that are operated exclusively or primarily for the use of the Army.

Navy Section of MIG (Including all Naval Collection and Dissemination)

Should have central Not susceptible of ONI location. CIG effort.

The field of intelligence covered by the Navy Section of the MIG (900), plus Naval Communications and

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the details of all installations (government owned or leased) such as Navy Yards, Naval Bases, Gun Factories, Training Stations, etc., that are operated exclusively or primarily for the use of the Navy. Characteristics of naval ships, such as armor, armament propulsion, tactical features, etc., are handled by the Technical Intelligence Branch of ONI.

3. Agents (foreign)

SSU Susceptible of Should have central or CIG effort. location.

Allocated to Army or CIG with Naval liaison.

II. MERCER UNDER JOINT DIRECTION

1. Political - Sociological Section

MIS Susceptible of Should have central A-2 GIG effort. location.

Includes the Political (3000 Section), Sociological (5000 Section) and Who's Who (7000 Section) of the
BID, and the Government, Foreign Relations, Political
Forces (100 Section) and People and Social Forces (200
Section) of the MIG and the Case History Section (C242)
of the Administrative Branch of ONI.

2. Economic Section

MIS Susceptible of CIG Should have central A-2 effort. location.

Includes the Economic (4000 Section) and Air-

Civil (2900 Section) of the BID and the Financial Matters (300 Section), Industry and Industrial Resources (400 Section), Commerce, Shipbuilding, Non-Military Vessels and Vehicles (500 Section) and Commercial Air and Communications Subheads of Aviation and Message Communication (700 and 1000 Sections) of the MIG.

3. Geographic Section

MIS Susceptible of Should have central A-2 CIG effort. location.

Includes the Topographic (6000 Section) of the BID and parts of the Physical Geography and Details of places (600 Section of the MIG) and intended to cover the following subjects:

- a. Topography
 b. Meteorology
 c. Oceanography
 d. Hydrography
 d. Eydrography
 e. Location and external physical features of fixed installations, such as cities, airfields, factories, rail-roads, etc.
- 4. Graphic Section (Photos, Maps)

MIS Susceptible of Should have central A-2 CIG effort. location.

This section contains all the photographic surveys and maps derived therefrom and is considered suitable for joint effort.

5. Intelligence Studies (JANIS)

MIS Susceptible of CIG Should have central location, but could operate in separate location.

Intelligence studies are now being produced by

a joint effort and should be so continued.

6. Situation Plot (for JCS)

MIS Susceptible of Should have central A-2 CIG effort. location.

Order of Battle - Army and Air
Disposition of Naval Forces
Disposition of shipping and civil air
Such a joint situation plot would be of immense value in wartime.

7. Army-Navy Air Intelligence (JANAID)

A-2 Not susceptible Should have central ONI of CIG effort. location.

This activity is now being set up as a joint activity under a JCS charter to study alien air offensive and defensive capabilities to include target analysis. In addition to the functions presently set forth in its charter, it should cover the Air Military Section of BID (2100-2800) and the Aviation Section of the MIG (1000). This should not include Civil Air but should include military air communications systems and details of all installations (government owned or leased) such as airfields, aircraft factories, etc., that are operated exclusively or primarily for the use of military and naval aviation.

The Economic Section should be set up to provide JANAID requirements in connection with target studies.

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Unless this service is adequate JANAID may have to cover the following additional fields:

- (1) Civil aircraft.
- (2) All aircraft factories and subsidiary part factories.
- (3) The possible conversion of automotive and other factories to wartime production for aircraft.
- (4) All aircraft facilities including airfields, radio and light beacons, air navigation aids similar to the Loran system, airborne and ground radar aids as applied to aircraft, etc.

8. Technical Intelligence Section

Should have central Not susceptible of MIS location. CIG effort. A-2 ONI

The Technical Intelligence activities of the War and Navy Departments complement each other. Much duplication may be eliminated and the overall efficiency increased if a JOINT TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER be provided in which the Technical Intelligence Activities of the Army and the Navy and the Scientific Branch of MIS will participate under the coordination and supervision of G-2 and ONI. This center should provide common facilities such as reception and filing of information, a Panel, and a means of easily undertaking joint studies and other activities of common interest.

9. Military Intelligence Library

Should have central Not susceptible MIS location. May be problems of GIG effort. A-2 of accessibility to uses. ONI

A joint military intelligence library should be

established as a reference library. It would be of tremendous help in making intelligence studies by joint effort.

10. Military Statistical Section

MIS Not susceptible Should have central A-2 of CIG effort. location.

It is believed that statistical studies can be improved and completed more economically as a joint effort.

11. Sabotage, espionage and counter-intelligence (foreign)

MIS Not susceptible Should have central location, but could operate in separate location.

It is believed that this field can be better and more economically covered as a joint effort.

12. Special Military Collection and Dissemination (wartime)

MIS Not susceptible Should have central A-2 of CIG effort. location.

- a. Intelligence teams in theaters of operations for the purpose of collecting and disposing of:
 - (1) Captured enemy documents
 - (2) Captured enemy equipment
- b. Intelligence personnel for POW interrogation.
- c. Courier and shipping service.
- d. Processing and Disseminating Center in Washington.

While this is primarily a wartime mission, still,

it lends itself to joint effort.

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D. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

I. EXCLUSIVELY DEPARTMENTAL

1. Investigations

Navy personnel to Navy

Located in Navy Department.

Army personnel to Army

Investigations of personnel and of cases involving matters and individuals solely within one service
should, it is believed, continue to be under the cognisance and control of that service.

2. Security

Naval Information and Establishments to Navy.

Located in Navy Department.

Army Information and Establishments to Army.

security of classified information and establishments in one service cannot be delegated without a change in basic law. While there is and must be coordination in these portions of this field, still, it is believed that they do not lend themselves to joint effort.

II. ALLOCATION (NO PARTICIPATION)

1. Security (Private Plants, Waterfronts, etc.)

Private Plants to Army

Waterfront and Merchant Seamen to Navy Located in Navy Department.

It is believed that the security of private plants is logically an Army function while the security of water-



fronts and the merchant marine is logically a Navy function. There should be coordination.

2. Sabotage, espionage and counter-intelligence (domestic)

Naval establishments to Navy

Located in Navy Department.

Army establishments to Army

adapt itself to joint effort. However, there are major differences in organization for this purpose within the Army and Navy that would render any such joint operations extremely difficult. The Army does not have a central control for this activity similar to that of the Navy. G-2, Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and the Army Service Forces, are all operating in this field. In addition, the Army Service Command areas and the Navy Districts differ. Radical readjustment in organization and geographical boundaries would be necessary in order to obtain smooth joint operation in this field.

3. Commerce and Travel (wartime)

By ships to Navy

Located in Navy Department.

By air and rail to Army

During the past war, the field of commerce and travel by ships was assigned to the Navy and that by air and rail to the Army. It lends itself to coordination but is not particularly susceptible to joint effort.

The Coast Guard, FBI, Customs, Immigration and Naturalisation, and the State Department are all interested in this field. Believe that little can be accomplished by merely joining the efforts of the War and Navy Departments in this activity.

4. Censorship (wartime)

Navy Personnel to Navy

Located in Navy Department.

Army Personnel to Army

The War Department to censor the mail of Army personnel and the Navy Department to censor the mail of Naval personnel in conformity with National Censorship Policy. While it is believed that uniform rules and procedures would be beneficial, still, it is believed that the end result can be better accomplished by coordination rather than by joint effort.

III. MERCER UNDER JOINT DIRECTION

1. Contact Register

MIS Not susceptible ONI of CIG effort.

Separate location satisfactory.

The collection of poign intelligence from sources within the country would seem to lend itself to joint effort in order to avoid duplication and to have all the information in one pool available to both.

2. Censorship (wartime) (Cable, Radio, Telephone, Telegraph and Civilian Mail.)

MIS Not susceptible ONI of CIG effort.

Separate location satisfactory.

It appears that this portion of the censorship

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field could be operated more efficiently and more economically as a joint effort. It will no doubt be transferred to National Censorship in wartime.

ENCLOSURE (B) TO JOINT ARMY-NAVY INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Estimated Naval Personnel and Civilian Employees Including Space Requirements for Same

	AC	CTIVITY				
	-				NNEL	SPACE
A Gre	oup -	Operational Intelligence		OFF.	CIV. (No	(in sq ft) Estimate)
B Gro	oup -	Intelligence Associated Activities				
I.		clusively Departmental		_		
		Personnel		3	17	1,500
	2,			3 1 2 6	,	400
	3.	Mail, Files, etc.	•	2	62	21,000
	4.	Naval Records and Library		6	30	19,000
4	5.	Top Secret Control and Dissemination		3	2	750
II.	-	ger Under Joint Direction				
	1.	Psychological Warfare				
,	2	Economic Warfare			•	700
		Special Publications		1	3 4 7	500
		Reproduction		-	14	500
	2.	Training		<u>.</u>	4	2,000
		Translating Photo Intelligence Center		1 1	•	1,000
	1 *	TIME THACTTISQUE CAUSEL		4	62*	19,000
		Foreign Intelligence				
I.		ocation (No Participation)				
	1.					
	2.	Navy Section to Navy		40	51	10,000
	3.			1		100
II.	Mer	ger Under Joint Direction				
	1.		(
	2.		(6	31	15,000
		Geographic)	(
		Oraphic		1 2	39	10,000
	5.				6	5,000
	6.	Situation Plot		1	1	3,000
	7.					-
		(JANAID), Including Military Air		32	46	7,800
	8.	Technical Intelligence		16	36	15,000
		Military Intelligence Library			1	10,000
	10.			1	3	3,000
	11.					•
		Intelligence (Foreign)		4	1	500
	12.	Dissemination (Wartime)		1	1 .	600

		TOTIVITY		CIV.	SPACE (in sq ft)				
D Gre	up -	- Domestic Intelligence							
	1.	Investigations		•					
		Navy Personnel to Navy Army Personnel to Army	2	17	2,400				
	2.	Security							
		Naval Information and Establishments							
		to Navy	8	27 **	11,000				
		Army Information and Establishments to Army							
II.	Allocation								
		Security (Private Plants, Waterfronts,	etc.)		,				
		Private Plants to Army							
	_	Waterfronts, Merchant Seamen to Navy		(1	nactive)				
	2.	Sabotage, Espionage & Counter Intelli- gence (Domestic)							
		Navy Establishments to Navy	2	10	1,200				
	3.	Army Establishments to Army Commerce and Travel (Wartime)							
		By ships to Navy		(Inactive)					
		By air and rail to Army		٠.					
	4.	Censorship (Wartime)							
		Navy Personnel to Navy		(I	nactive)				
		Army Personnel to Army			•				
III.	Mer	ger Under Joint Direction							
	1.	Contact Register	6	10	1,200				
	2.) - -						
		phone, Telegraph and Civilian Mail		(I	nactive)				
			untidena.co	**********					
		CRAND TOTALS	145	474	154,450				

^{* 10} of these enlisted men ** includes one (1) enlisted man